The responsibilities of the political animal during the anthropocene by Zwart, H.A.E.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a preprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/33203
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
The Responsibilities of the political 
animal during the anthropocene 
Hub Zwart 
 
 
Prelude: ‘Foul weather’ 
Jules Verne (1828-1905) is still world-famous today for his scientific adventure novels. 
One of the highlights of his tremendous output is From the earth to the moon (De la terre 
à la lune). In this novel, published in 1865, a canon of gigantic proportions is fabricated 
with the objective of discharging a manned capsule in the direction of the moon. In order 
to achieve this goal, an enormous industrial plant is created in the pristine wilderness of 
Florida. Although enthusiasm regarding the ambitions and achievements of science is the 
basic attitude in Verne’s novels during this period, there is a clear apprehension of the 
detrimental effects of human industrial activity on the earth’s climate as well. This is how 
the setting is described on the eve of the explosion:  
 
“The weather was magnificent. Despite the approach of winter, the sun shone brightly, and 
bathed in its radiant light that earth which three of its denizens were about to abandon for a 
new world” (1865/1982, p. 336). 
 
Finally, the canon is fired and the next chapter, bearing the ominous title “Foul Weather”, 
contains a striking description of the impact of the event: 
 
“The weather, hitherto so fine, suddenly changed; the sky became heavy with clouds. It could 
not have been otherwise after the terrible derangement of the atmospheric strata, and the 
dispersion of the enormous quantity of vapour arising from the combustion of 200,000 pounds 
of pyroxyle! … On the morrow the horizon was covered with clouds-- a thick and impenetrable 
curtain between earth and sky, which unhappily extended as far as the Rocky Mountains. It was 
a fatality! But since man had chosen so to disturb the atmosphere, he was bound to accept the 
consequences of his experiment” (p. 354). 
 
In other words, even Jules Verne, who in the 1860s figured as an apostle of scientific 
progress, had a clear awareness as to what the side-effects of human productivity and 
industrial expansion would amount to. The experiment with the capsule fired at the moon 
was indeed an experiment, something of a prelude – a beginning. It was quite clear to 
Verne that if these technologies would be developed on a larger scale, their 
environmental impact would be devastating and lasting and the prospects in terms of 
environmental weather forecasting would be most gloomy. In Verne’s novel, the initiative 
to start the experiment is taken by a small number of individuals, obsessed with an idea. 
One of the moral questions raised by Verne in his book is whether it is really wise to 
leave such fateful decisions in the hand of a few individuals. Should not governments 
take their responsibility here? In those days, however, time was not yet ripe for 
coordinated international action, supported by national authorities. The major political 
forces of the day were engaged in a dramatic competition, a kind of technological and 
industrial rat race, and the global environment was not yet an item of general political 
concern. Nowadays, however, the prospects for the development of coordinated 
international policies seem - more favourable? 
 
1. Global responsibility: the dawning of the anthropocene 
In 1979, Hans Jonas published his book The Principle of responsibility (Das Prinzip 
Verantwortung), still rightly regarded as a core contribution to the field of environmental 
philosophy. In this book he basically stated that the present situation is without 
precedent in human history. Therefore, we are in need of a completely new, 
environmental ethic. 
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Ancient ethics, Jonas tells us, emerged at a time when nature was immense, 
inexhaustible and largely beyond human control. The focus of ethics was on the 
immediate or short-term consequences human actions and decisions might have for 
other humans. Nowadays, however, human activity is bound to have a global impact. 
Therefore, a completely new ethic has to be developed that allows us to focus on the 
global and long-term effects of our doings. Ethics will have to become a “comparative 
futurology”. We will have to develop the ethical tools that will allow us to compare 
different scenarios for future development, starting from decisions we are about to take 
in the present. According to Jonas, the basic principle for such an ethic can be formulated 
as follows: “Act in such a way that true human life remains possible in the future”.  This 
calls for sustainable development of course. Future generations will critically review our 
activities and decisions in retrospect. They will hold us responsible for what we are doing 
(of fail to do) now. 
 
Man’s impact on the environment is omnipresent to such an extent that the Nobel Prize 
winning expert in atmospheric chemistry Paul Crutzen1 (Crutzen & Stoermer 2000, 
Crutzen 2002) introduced the term anthropocene in order to characterise the present 
era. He coined the term to describe the most recent period in the earth's history, starting 
in the 18th century when the activities of the human race first began to have a significant 
global effect on the earth's climate and ecosystems. Crutzen regards the influence of 
mankind as so significant that it is appropriate to say that we have indeed entered a new 
geological era. Humans have become a geologic agent comparable to erosion and 
eruptions. The term anthropocene emphasizes the central role of mankind in geology and 
ecology during the current (in many ways human-dominated) geological epoch. For the 
past three centuries, Crutzen tells us, the effects of humans on the global environment 
have escalated. Notably because of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide, global 
climate is likely to depart significantly from the natural behaviour of the atmosphere. The 
anthropocene started in the latter part of the eighteenth century, when analyses of air 
trapped in polar ice showed the beginning of growing global concentrations of carbon 
dioxide and methane – and this date of course coincided with James Watt’s invention of 
the steam engine. According to Crutzen, unless there is a global catastrophe, mankind 
will remain a major environmental force for millennia to come. A daunting task lies ahead 
for scientists and engineers2 to guide society towards environmentally sustainable 
management during this era. It will require appropriate behavioural adaptation at all 
scales and may well involve large-scale geo-engineering in order to optimize the climate. 
Crutzen’s statement raises a series of questions, but it clearly articulates in a geological 
way the Jonas-like conviction that the human impact on the global conditions of life is 
something far beyond the ordinary, far beyond the natural course of geological 
development. 
 
The phenomenon as such that organisms dramatically alter the environment is not 
without precedent in history of course. We only have to think of the life form that, during 
the early days of the evolution, introduced oxygen into the atmosphere. This was 
basically a drama of pollution, referred to by Margulis and Sagan (1997) as the “oxygen 
holocaust”. In the beginning, the world was anaerobic. Anaerobic micro-organisms 
evolved some 3 to 4 billion years ago and life on earth remained anaerobic for hundreds 
of millions of years until, about 2 billion years ago, the first worldwide pollution crisis 
occurred, due to organisms that dumped oxygen as a waste product into the 
atmosphere. This dramatic event has had positive effects as well, of course, for it made 
life possible for completely new life forms, - life forms that depended on the availability 
of oxygen in the atmosphere – including man. In short, for life forms to have a global 
environmental impact is in itself not new. What is remarkable and unprecedented about 
the present situation, however, is not only the pace of the world-wide pollution (which 
evolves, when seen from a geological perspective and measured in terms of a geological 
                                                     
1 Crutzen received the Nobel Prize for his stratospheric ozone research in 1995. 
2 Interestingly, he does not mention policy makers or politicians in this respect. 
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time-scale, with catastrophic speed), but also the fact that we human beings happen to 
be an intelligent species. We know what we are doing, we can measure and determine 
(with astonishing precision) the impact of our activities on the global environment. And, 
above all, we are able, in principle at least, to critically review and, if necessary, to 
accommodate our behaviour, to change our style of life. And this combination is what 
makes the present situation really unique. Human life has a global impact. We applied 
science and technology to transform the earth into a global technotope that uses up the 
earth’s supplies and gives back pollution in return. But we can also use science and 
technology in order to assess the level of impact we have. Comparative futurology – as a 
normative discipline - is an option that is really accessible to us. 
 
From a philosophical point of view, these are important issues that need further 
elaboration. First of all we are confronted with an epistemological question: What to 
make of complicated scientific data involved? Do they contain clear messages? Next, an 
ethical question speaks out to us: How to take (under the present circumstances) 
decisions that are responsible and ethically sound, notably when seen in a broader 
(global) perspective? Before answering these questions it is important to realise that, in 
philosophical terms, the anthropocene coincides, not only with the dawning of the 
industrial revolution, but also with what Oswald Spengler in 1918 referred to as the point 
in time when the “faustian” culture, the faustian style of thought, became a large-scale 
civilisation. The faustian style began as a small-scale phenomenon: a scientific revolution 
that slowly emerged in the fourteenth century and eventually produced early modern 
scientific heroes like Galileï, Newton and others. During the final decades of the 
eighteenth century, however, this style of thought assumed world-wide proportions in the 
form of the industrial revolution. This revolution basically consisted in building the 
faustian way of looking at and interacting with the natural world into powerful 
technologies and machines. But what exactly did Spengler mean by faustian? 
 
2. The faustian era 
According to Spengler, faustian science is driven by a will to power, a will to dominate 
the (natural) world. In the context of experimental research, natural phenomena are 
maltreated and manipulated until they finally give up their secrets. The ultimate aim, 
however, is not knowledge per se, but technological dominance. Faustian civilisation is 
restless, dynamic, vigorous and energetic. It strives for mobilisation and exploitation, 
both of natural and of human resources. It is directed towards expansion and growth and 
is characterised by an almost obsessive readiness to accept enormous risks. In Faustian 
ethics, conscience (“Gewissen”) plays a crucial role. Faustian individuals are relentlessly 
active and willing to take dramatic decisions, but at the same time they have a strong 
conscience, they are tormented by a pervading sense of guilt, which sometimes may 
cause them to take dramatic self-corrective measures. They know that they are behaving 
violently. Eventually, however, a civilisation of this type cannot maintain itself, and this 
explains Spengler’s gloomy title: Untergang des Abendlandes, usually translated as 
“decline of the West”, although “collapse of the West” would perhaps be a more adequate 
alternative. Thus, before going into epistemological arguments over the credibility of 
scientific data and into the ethical arguments over our responsibilities towards future 
generations and non-human forms of life, I first want to gain a better understanding of 
the moral and epistemological profile of the kind of civilisation, the “faustian” West, that 
brought about the dramatic environmental dilemma we are now facing. 
 
Basically, two kinds of stories are told about this culture, two basic scenarios have been 
fleshed out. On the one hand we are confronted with stories that emphasise the 
remarkable achievements of faustian civilisation in terms of progress. Although the 
faustian era did have its violent and painful moments, we are told that in the long run 
faustian science and technology dramatically improved the quality of human life. We 
have made progress in terms of virtually all the relevant criteria. 
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Other, bleaker stories, however, try to convince us that the exact opposite is true: 
progress is apparent and short-dated. In reality, we are heading for disaster. In fact, two 
authors whose stories belong to this category have greatly influenced our image of 
faustian civilisation, notably of the nineteenth century, namely Marx and Malthus. 
 
According to Karl Marx (1818 – 1883), the nineteenth century is an epoch of growing 
malaise, of Verelendung, and this notably applies to the working classes. His gloomy 
predictions did not come true. We now know that in the course of the nineteenth century 
the quality of human life and the social prospects of individuals dramatically improved, 
notably for those belonging to what Marx referred to as the possession-less “proletariat”. 
If we read his book Das Kapital we cannot fail to notice that, although empirical data are 
built into his views, theory always prevails. In others word, his theory, or rather his 
scenario determines what data he will find usable. His use of empirical material is, to put 
it bluntly, extremely biased and selective. He only mentions the data that fit in, or can be 
interpreted in such a manner. Everything else is simply left out. The basic message is 
that the catastrophe, the great collapse of capitalism (as the final stage of faustian 
civilisation so to speak) is imminent. All progress is apparent and temporary. The story of 
gradual progress, used by capitalist culture in order to legitimise itself, is effectively 
silenced by the violent, apocalyptic message of imminent collapse. 
 
The story told by Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) may stand as the “right-wing” 
counterpart of the Marxist version. Malthus introduced a crucial (mathematical) concept 
into the debate: the concept of exponential growth, which is still at the heart of 
contemporary environmental deliberation. According to Malthus, nature tends to oscillate 
between abundance and deprivation. In times of abundance, a particular species will tend 
to multiply in an exponential fashion until natural resources are used up. From then on, a 
period of shortage and decimation (mass starvation) will occur. Being moral subjects, 
however, human beings in principle have the possibility to get away from this eternally 
reoccurring natural catastrophe, namely by means of rigorous self-control, notably in the 
form of birth-control and temperance. If we are willing and able to take suitable 
measures we may flatten the growth curve into a more moderate, civilised pattern. Thus, 
we may use our resources in a more intelligent way. Technological improvements 
(notably of agricultural production) will do the rest. The basic moral message is: we are 
heading for a catastrophe, but we can (and should) do something about it. 
 
“Marx” and “Malthus”, the left-wing and right-wing version of the story, have a few 
things in common. They both point out that a dramatic catastrophe is imminent, but that 
something can be done. These stories appeal to our conscience and call upon us to take 
sides. These and other, more or less similar stories try to convince us that measures, if 
necessary of draconian, “faustian” proportions, are inevitable. 
 
In retrospect, stories of this kind, of which countless examples can be given, are bound 
to make us somewhat suspicious, for two reasons. First of all, most of these stories are 
still extremely faustian themselves. They take for granted that we see ourselves as 
beings-in-control. The relationship between human beings and their environment is seen 
from an anthropocentric point of view, apparently beyond dispute. But at the same time 
it is clear that this “faustian” attitude, this faustian way of seeing things, lies at the heart 
of the problems we are facing. If we want to respond to the environmental crisis in a 
responsible manner, perhaps we should first try to reflect more critically on the way we 
see ourselves. If we look at contemporary environmental debates over environmental 
pollution and our responsibilities towards future generations from the perspective of the 
writings of Martin Heidegger, for example, we would notice that nature is still 
experienced and described by most authors as a reservoir that is to be consumed and 
exploited by human beings (albeit in a fair and responsible manner). Should we not 
rather opt for a view in which nature herself is granted a more active role, and human 
beings a more moderate one? 
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Another reason why these stories tend to arouse suspicion, on my part at least, comes 
from the fact that they have been told so many times already. Time and again, in 
countless versions, we have been informed that a catastrophe is imminent. In reality, 
however, if we try to look more soberly at the facts, the faustian era was a time of 
tremendous, unprecedented increase in terms of quality of life. And even with regard to 
nature itself a less devastating, less alarming, more differentiated and fine-grained 
analysis seems both possible and preferable. It is beyond doubt that nature has been 
maltreated, but at the same time we are faced with examples of resilience and recovery. 
In many respects, while problematic forms of exploitations continue and should be 
addressed effectively, signs of improvement are visible as well. Yet, somehow, taking a 
more differentiated view seems something which is difficult to do. Whoever becomes 
involved in environmental debate will experience a remarkably strong, almost magnetic 
inclination, a tendency to repeat the alarming message - that a catastrophe is imminent. 
But can we still believe it when we realise that this message is perhaps as old as faustian 
civilisation itself? That it is, so to speak, its inevitable companion? The era of faustian 
civilisation started in 1789 (the year of the French Revolution) and ended in 1989 (the 
year of the collapse of the Berlin Wall). During these two-hundred years, the downfall of 
Western society has been announced in so many ways that nowadays it seems to be 
loosing its credibility. Would it be possible that we have entered a new, post-faustian era 
that calls for a post-faustian attitude towards nature, towards ourselves, for a post-
faustian ethic? 
 
3. The catastrophe as an archetype 
Why do we so desperately want to be convinced that we are heading for a disaster? The 
recently released movie Where will you be? is a perfect exemplification of the 
archetypical image of a man-induced catastrophe. The movie’s basic message is that a 
climatologic event of apocalyptic dimensions is about to happen. It will involve floodings 
and dramatic fluctuations in temperature. Huge coastal cities will be devastated. It is the 
climate change scenario, but in a highly compressed version. Intricate debates among 
experts over how to interpret huge sets of complicated data related to climate change 
are suddenly translated into a highly effective image. This is the movie’s revelatory 
effect. It makes visible what we, the general public, experience as both frightening and 
fascinating whenever the climate change issue is raised by mass media. We are on the 
look-out for a disaster – we expect nothing less. We focus our attention on the likelihood 
of dramatically exponential growth curves. We are both intrigued and disturbed by the 
idea that we are having such an enormous impact on the global environment. 
 
At the same time, the film stresses that we have to be on the alert - not only for 
disturbing facts and findings related to climate change as such. We also have to be 
attentive to the way we tend to respond to this type of information. Our interpretations 
and perceptions are influenced by or even guided by the catastrophe-scenario, the 
catastrophe-archetype. This scenario involves typical expectations, typical clues and 
plots, typical images and events. The point is not that we should get rid of such ideas. 
We simply have to rely on scenarios in order to be able to understand and interact with 
our cultural environment in an effective manner. The important thing is, however, that 
we have to be aware that these scenario’s are at work and that we, while processing 
information, remain susceptible to the preconceived framework they entail. Typical, 
arche-typical expectations are craving for confirmation. We all tend to think a little bit 
like Marx, so to speak, we tend to focus on the facts that fit in, at the expense of other 
data. The idea that we have become dependent, to a large extent, on an environment of 
our own making, on a global technotope, makes us feel uneasy in a very fundamental 
way. Somehow, we are convinced of the fact that this situation cannot be maintained, 
that this artificial, emergent world, far beyond individual control, this continuously 
evolving outcome of countless individual decisions and contributions, cannot last. 
Somehow, we are certain that our gloomy intuitions will be confirmed. And this 
conviction is linked to the moral intuition that something drastically needs to be done. 
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The persistent image of the imminent catastrophe is not only congenial with the basic 
uneasiness that is an inevitable part of living in a technotope. It also confirms our 
“faustian” sense of responsibility and guilt. We know we have always been doing 
something wrong, we are convinced of that. We know that violent types of activity are at 
the basis of our faustian way of life. Our sense of guilt is elaborated in two directions. In 
the first place, it refers to nature as such, which we spoiled and maltreated in the context 
of industrial production. But sooner or later, future generations (the secular version of 
the faustian God) will pass a judgement on us, and we better prepare ourselves for that. 
But there is a second dimension of guilt and this dimension refers, not to those that are 
distant in terms of time, but to those that are distant in terms of space: the inhabitants 
of developing countries. This adds up to the truly faustian dilemma of how to weigh our 
obligations towards nature against our obligations towards the developing world. A 
typically faustian way of framing an environmental dilemma would run as follows: how 
are we to choose between endangered species and starving children? Both options pre-
suppose that we are the beings-in-control, that we are the ones whose decisions will 
make the difference. Before coming back to these issues in the final section of my paper, 
I would now like to say something about the Kyoto declaration as such and the 
intellectual discussions that surround it. 
 
4. The Kyoto Convention and related issues 
The Kyoto Framework Convention on Climate Change starts from the conviction that 
climate change is of common concern to mankind. It acknowledges that there are many 
uncertainties in the predictions of climate change and that efforts to address climate 
change should be based on sound scientific research and on data that are continually re-
evaluated. In other words, we should take heed not to give in to the catastrophe-idea too 
easily. Our intuitions have to be exposed to scientific check-ups time and again. Parties 
should promote scientific research and the development of data archives to further our 
understanding of climate change and they should promote the full and open exchange of 
relevant scientific information. 
 
In the ethical sections it is stated that we should protect the climate system for the 
benefit of present and future generations of humankind. Parties (supporting countries) 
should take precautionary measures to minimize climate change and to mitigate its 
adverse effect. But they should also cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impact 
of climate change. In other words, the document does not really choose between two 
more or less rival strategies for addressing the challenge of climate change, namely: 
mitigation (reducing anthropogenic emissions) versus adaptation (accepting the fact of 
climate change as such, while building dikes and other defences in areas at risk to forgo 
calamities). Finally, the parties involved should promote public awareness of what is 
happening. 
 
All these considerations seem reasonable and obvious. What controversies, 
philosophically speaking, are involved here? It is perhaps difficult to read them in the 
document as such. They are bound to be veiled more or less by the “diplomatic” 
language used in a document that basically strives for international consensus. In order 
to bring these implicit controversies to the fore more clearly, I will consult two other, 
more provocative sources that more or less explicitly regard the Kyoto document as an 
important starting point for further deliberation. 
 
I will start with a very controversial, challenging document, namely Bjorn Lomborg’s The 
sceptical environmentalist, published in 2001. Unlike so many other contributions to the 
environmental debate, Lomborg provocatively states that things are getting better, that 
we are making progress, and that we are not heading for a catastrophe. In order to 
address environmental challenges effectively, we must not act on myths but on facts, 
upon sound evidence. Most of all, we should be critical towards the all pervasive “litany 
of our ever deteriorating environment”, shaped by images and messages that confront us 
each day (p. 3). Lomborg believes that this image is not backed up by the available 
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evidence. Moreover, the dramatic cures proposed on the basis of this litany are likely to 
have an impact much worse than the current affliction. Mankind’s lot has improved in 
terms of practically every measurable indicator, especially if we look at long-term trends. 
Lomborg is critical of the use of short-term fluctuations as confirmations of sweeping 
apocalyptic announcements. We need reliable data and sound comparisons. Lomborg 
points out that, in today’s global environment, with its massive amounts of information 
available, an infinite number of stories can be told about the present situation (p. 7). The 
story that we are heading for a catastrophe, is too easily taken for granted, not by the 
experts themselves, but by the mass media and the NGOs. 
 
According to Lomborg, the litany of our ever deteriorating environment (“Everyone 
knows the planet is in bad shape”, etc.) is not in accordance with expert findings. It is 
not in keeping with reality. Most publicized fears are incorrect, he claims (p. 5), but the 
litany has pervaded the debate so deeply and for so long “that blatantly false claims can 
be made again and again without reference” (p. 12). This is not due to primary research 
in the environmental field, for according to Lomborg the bulk of it is competent and well-
balanced. Rather, it is due to the way environmental knowledge is communicated. 
Lomborg argues that public environmental communication taps deeply into doomsday 
beliefs while “propaganda” (p. 12) presented by large and influential environmental NGOs 
(such as Greenpeace and WWF) is too readily picked up by the media. 
It goes without saying that this book has met with a storm of reactions. Some of his pre-
suppositions are indeed controversial, such as his statement that only the prospects for 
human beings are morally relevant and that we cannot speak meaningfully about our 
obligations towards other life-forms (“We have no option but to use humans as our point 
of reference”). A more bio-centred, less anthropo-centred view would no doubt affect 
several of his conclusions. Whereas it is true that only human beings have the ability to 
enter into moral deliberations, so that anthropocentrism in this sense is our inevitable 
starting point, this does not mean that only human beings are per definition our sole 
concern. Too readily, however, Lomborg is depicted as someone who is environmentally 
incorrect in the sense that he tries to justify continuing human expansion at the expense 
of the environment. I rather read his book as an important contribution by an 
exceptionally well-documented expert who is deeply concerned about the environment, 
but who at the same time tries to warn us against the pitfalls of the catastrophe 
archetype. It may not be the best possible guide when it comes to policy building and 
decision making during the decades to come. 
I will come back to Lomborg in the final section of my paper, but before doing so I would 
like to consult a second influential document, namely Peter Singer’s recent book One 
World (2002). It can be regarded as an up-date of Hans Jonas’ influential book The 
principle of responsibility discussed above as its basic line of thought is similar. For eons, 
Singer tells us, people lived in relatively small and separate worlds. But now people living 
on opposite sides of the world are linked in ways previously unimaginable (p. 3). The 
revolution has created a global audience. Therefore, we need to justify our behaviour to 
the whole world. Our value system evolved in circumstances in which the atmosphere, 
like the oceans, seemed an unlimited resource, but now conditions have changed 
dramatically. How can we adjust our ethics to take account of this new situation? 
According to Singer, how well we come through the era of globalisation (and perhaps 
whether we come through it at all) will depend on how we respond ethically to the idea 
that we live in one world (p. 13). 
 
This seems a very convincing line of argument. Nevertheless, there are certain pages and 
section that make me somewhat suspicious in the light of what was said earlier. This, for 
example, is how the book starts: 
 
“Consider two aspects of globalization: first, planes exploding as they slam into the World Trade 
Center, and second, the emission of carbon dioxide from the exhausts of utility vehicles. One 
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brought instant death… the other makes a contribution to climate change that can be detected 
only by scientific instruments” (p. 1) 
 
Although I regard Singer’s book as well-informed and balanced, it is nevertheless clear 
that, from the very first page, the catastrophe-scenario is present. According to Singer, 
we are faced with a disaster, less dramatically visible perhaps that the Twin Towers 
disaster, and slowly evolving, but eventually its impact will be much larger. The 
catastrophe-scenario is presented in a rather moderate manner, not (as is the case in 
some other documents) in a shrill voice, but it is there all the same. We are confronted 
with a gloomy, apocalyptic image. Hurricanes and tropical storms will move farther away 
from the equator and hit large urban areas that have not been built to cope with them. 
Tropical diseases will start to spread. Food production will decrease, notably in sub-
Saharan Africa. Sea levels will rise dramatically, coastal ecosystems will change beyond 
recognition and coral reefs will be destroyed. And we are to blame for all this. A direct 
appeal to our faustian sense of guilt is made when it is stated that the Western3 lifestyle 
“may lead to the deaths of millions of people” (p. 2). 
 
Singer’s views are supported by careful research. The IPCC Third Assessment Report 
(published in 2001) is cited as having produced scientific evidence that human activities 
are changing the climate of our planet. As a scientific document it is open to criticism, 
but according to Singer it reflects a broad consensus of leading scientific opinion. It is by 
far the most authoritative view, he claims. I do not doubt this, and I share Singer’s 
concerns. But still I find the script, the scenario, the images that Singer reads into his 
sources remarkably familiar, to an uncanny degree. And the same goes for the moral 
message connected with it. According to Singer, climate change has revealed bizarre new 
ways of killing people. “By spraying deodorant at your armpit in your New York 
apartment, you could … be contributing to the skin cancer death of people living in 
Chile”. I seriously doubt whether inciting us to assume an over-sensitive hyper-
conscience will be a viable starting point for environmental policy. 
 
Several times, the Kyoto declaration is discussed. According to Singer it is important not 
to see Kyoto as the solution, but as the first step, a necessary step. Kyoto provides a 
platform from which a more far-reaching and also more equitable agreement can be 
reached. Especially the United States serve as a target of Singer’s criticism. The 
international effort to build a global community is hampered by the repeated failure of 
the United States to play its part. Until now the United States has refused to join the 178 
states that have accepted the Kyoto protocol. But Singer is convinced that eventually 
the United States will be shamed into joining in. 
 
Why does such a remark make me feel uneasy? Because I think that the appeal to the 
catastrophe-scenario, in connection with strong normative appeals to our sense of guilt 
and shame, are no longer the most effective ways of dealing with the problem of climate 
change and all that it might entail. The catastrophe scenario can be effective in a 
situation when public awareness is minimal and broad audiences must be awoken from 
their ethical slumber, but under the present circumstances, it is more likely to have the 
opposite effect: because of its doomsday tone of voice it can become paralysing. I do not 
think the world population will be shamed into changing its style of life. On the contrary, 
for millions and millions of people living conditions have dramatically improved during 
recent decades and large groups of people in developing countries will continue to adopt 
a more or less Western way of life. Our aim should not be to stop the global cultural 
revolution that is taking place, on normative grounds, but we rather should invest in the 
technologies we need to develop more sustainable ways of production as well as in 
technologies for geo-engineering. What we need is not a hyper-conscience, but new and 
sophisticated form of science and technology. 
 
                                                     
3 Singer actually uses the word ‘American’ here.  
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What is to be done? 
I agree with both Lomborg and Singer that we have to build on the best available 
evidence. But in order to do so, we have to free ourselves from the catastrophe scenario. 
Instead, we have to produce a view whose moral message is not aimed at creating global 
panic, but rather strives for deliberate and well-targeted action. What kind of ethos do 
we need? First of all, we must accept that our situation is not unequivocally catastrophic. 
A differentiated diagnosis that takes into account all the relevant facts, both favourable 
and unfavourable, is both possible and necessary. We should be more active in 
convincing influential actors such as the mass media and the international NGOs that 
scientific data should not be read with the sole purpose of finding confirmation for the 
idea that we are the cause of a world-wide disaster. Data should not be used in a biased 
and instrumental manner, as stepping stones to achieve political goals (a political 
transformation of a particular way of life). And it terms of morality, we should not focus 
on the faustian tendency to act out of guilt or shame. Rather, science and technology, 
the factors that initially caused the world-wide environmental crisis, will increasingly 
become the factors that will allow us to solve it. Paradoxically, we should invest in 
furthering scientific expansion. We need science, both to investigate and visualise the 
problem and to solve it. 
 
Last but not least, we should grant nature a more active role. In the present, post-
faustian era she should no longer be seen merely as a reservoir of raw materials. Until 
recently, we saw ourselves as engineers (the kind of engineers immortalised by writers 
like Jules Verne) that transformed the raw materials of nature into products that could be 
of use to human beings. In recent years, however, our understanding of nature has 
experienced a dramatic shift. Scientists in various disciplines have begun to appreciate 
the astonishing complexities of nature. And they have acquired the sophisticated 
research tools that allow them to study this complexity. In the long run, this will allow 
mankind to use, or rather: interact with nature in a more intelligent manner, consuming 
less energy and producing less waste. Nature is no longer the passive victim of the 
faustian engineer, but should rather be understood in terms of highly complex, adaptive 
systems, that can and will be used in a more sophisticated way by present and future 
generations, and from which a lot can still be learned. We are entering an era of green 
industries and bio-materials. Nature is no longer the passive victim of human decision 
making. Rather, what we are faced with is a complex process of co-evolution of human 
society and the natural environment. The global human community will not give up its 
aspiration towards further improvement of living conditions, but we will acquire the 
knowledge and tools that allow us to realise this goal in a more intelligent, more 
sustainable, less polluting manner.  
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